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THE TREATY POWER AND AMERICAN
FEDERALISM, PART II
Curtis

A . Bradley*

In an article published in this Review two years ago, I described
and critiqued what I called the "nationalist view" of the treaty power.1
Under this view, the national government has the constitutional power
to enter into treaties, and thereby create binding national law by vir
tue of the Supremacy Clause, without regard to either subject matter
or federalism limitations. This view is reflected in the writings of a
number of prominent foreign affairs law scholars, as well as in the
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. In my article, I argued that this view was,
among other things, inconsistent with the limited and enumerated
powers structure of the U.S. Constitution. I also argued that this in
consistency was becoming more significant, as the range of treaty
making has expanded and as the Supreme Court has given new life to
federalism restraints in the domestic arena.
Recently, Professor David Golove published a 240-page article in
this Review that takes issue with much of my analysis.2 Invoking con
stitutional text, structure, precedent, and history, Golove attempts to
set forth a broad-based defense of the nationalist view. Notwith
standing our disagreements, there is much in Golove's article that I
admire, and it is certainly an important contribution to the debate
over the scope of the treaty power. Golove's historical narrative, while
not without its difficulties, is particularly enlightening and reflects a
prodigious amount of research. Unfortunately, the historical portion
of the article is book-ended with discussions that are rather polemical
and exaggerated in tone and substance.3 More importantly, those who

* Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. For helpful comments and sugges
tions, I thank Kathryn Bradley, Barry Cushman, Martin Flaherty, Jack Goldsmith, David
Golove, Mike Klarman, Julian Ku, Daryl Levinson, Hiroshi Motomura, Bob Nagel, Steve
Smith, Paul Stephan, Ted White, and John Yoo. For excellent research assistance, I thank
Michael Bell and Cynthia Orchard.
1. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH.
(1998).
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2. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
3. For example, even though the scope of the treaty power has been vigorously debated
throughout U.S. history - by serious scholars, prominent public officials, and federal judges
- Golove proclaims that "the text and structure of the Constitution, as well as original in
tent, leave little room for serious debate." Id. at 1078.
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were looking for a full debate between Golove and myself over the
scope of the treaty power are likely to be disappointed. Golove's arti
cle, even with its historical discussion, largely fails to engage my cri
tique of the nationalist view.
In this reply, I will make four points. First, despite claiming to do
so, Golove's article does not in fact defend the nationalist view that I
critiqued. Second, Golove's proposed subject matter limitation on the
treaty power reflects a false assumption about the views of other for
eign affairs scholars and, more importantly, lacks any meaningful con
tent. Third, Golove purports to accept the Supreme Court's recent
federalism decisions as a baseline, but much of his analysis is inconsis
tent with those decisions. Finally, Golove's historical discussion, while
rich in detail, is both methodologically inconsistent and tendentious.
I.

THE "NATIONALIST VIEW" OF THE TREATY POWER

In my original article, I coined the term "nationalist view" to refer
to the proposition that the treaty power is limited neither by subject
matter nor by the reserved powers and rights of the states.4 The fol
lowing statement by Professor Lori Damrosch reflects the view I had
in mind: " [T]he treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on the
states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights should not be as
serted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty obliga
tions. "5 One of the central claims of my article was that the two ele
ments to the nationalist view - the lack of a subject matter limitation
and the lack of states' rights limitations - had developed largely in
isolation but were now being combined in academic commentary and
in the Restatement (Third).6 If accepted together, I argued, these two
elements of the nationalist view would give the treatymakers essen
tially unlimited power vis-a-vis the states. I criticized this view as in
consistent with constitutional text and structure, as well as with the
Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions.
The principal significance of the nationalist view is that it would
allow the treatymakers the ability to circumvent federalism limitations
otherwise applicable to the national government's exercise of law
making power. Some commentators have suggested, for example, that
Congress could reenact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act -

4. Bradley, supra note 1, at 393.
5. Id. (quoting Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning
"Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991)).
For other examples of the nationalist view, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§§ 302, 303 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)); Lours HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
1 89-93, 197 (2d ed. 1996); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 33, 46 (1997).
6. Bradley, supra note 1, at 423, 433.
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which was invalidated by the Supreme Court on the ground that it ex
ceeded Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment7 - as an
implementation of an existing treaty commitment.8 Similarly, in a re
cent case involving the Violence Against Women Act, a group of in
ternational law scholars filed an arnicus curiae brief arguing that, even
if the statute exceeded Congress's powers (as the Supreme Court ul
timately concluded), it should be upheld as a valid implementation of
a treaty.9 Commentators also have argued that the treatymakers have
the ability to "commandeer" state legislatures and executive officials,
notwithstanding Supreme Court decisions disallowing Congress from
doing so.10
At the end of my article, I considered various constructions of the
treaty power that might reconcile the need for flexibility in interna
tional negotiations with the structural principles of American federal
ism. The best contemporary construction, I argued, was one that
would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any
subject but would limit their ability to create supreme federal law to
the scope of Congress's power to do so. This construction would give
the treatymakers substantial power to create supreme federal law,
while at the same time preventing an end run around the federalism
limitations applicable to Congress's creation of such law.11 As I ac
knowledged, my proposed construction would probably require the
limiting or overruling of the Supreme Court's 1920 decision, Missouri

7. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 5, at 52-53; Jeri Nazary Sute, Comment, Reviving
RFRA: Congressional Use of Treaty-Implementing Powers to Protect Religious Exercise
Rights, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1535, 1535-38 (1998).
9. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights
Experts in Support of Petitioners at 28-30, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029). The Supreme Court held that a portion of the Act was invalid be
cause it exceeded Congress's powers; the Court did not mention the treaty argument. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Martin Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights"
in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1999); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1260 (1995); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still
Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726 (1998); see also
Neuman, supra note 5, at 52 (suggesting that the New York anti-commandeering decision
may not be applicable to the treaty power); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil
Liberties Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1650-55 (1999) (making same suggestion re
garding the Printz anti-commandeering decision).
11. Congress has substantial power, of course, to create supreme federal Jaw in both the
domestic and foreign affairs contexts. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S.
Ct. 2288 (2000) (finding that Congress had preempted a state statute that was designed to
restrict trade with Burma). In addition, some treaties do not depend on the creation of su
preme federal law for their efficacy, and those treaties would be unaffected by my proposed
construction even if they exceeded Congress's powers. Cf. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
598 (1884) ("[A treaty] depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties to it.").
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v. Holland,12 which upheld the statutory implementation of a migra
tory birds treaty even though the statute may have been beyond Con
gress's legislative powers at that time.
Throughout his article, Golove describes himself as defending the
"nationalist view" against my critique.13 In fact, the view that he de
fends is, in many respects, narrower than the one I critiqued. Contrary
to the conventional academic wisdom that I criticized, Golove accepts
the possibility that much of the Supreme Court's recent federalism ju
risprudence applies to limit the treaty power, and he also purports to
accept a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. The only limi
tation that Golove specifically argues against is one that would restrict
the ability of the treatymakers to create supreme federal law to the
scope of Congress's power to do so. In other words, Golove seeks only
to defend a narrow version of the Court's holding in Holland. Conse
quently, his article is not a defense of the nationalist view that I cri
tiqued, but rather is a response to the particular construction of the
treaty power I proposed at the end of my article.
Golove begins by acknowledging that "treaties, like all other gov
ernmental acts, are subject to the Constitution" and that treaties that
violated specific constitutional prohibitions would be unconstitu
tional.14 I would certainly agree, although there is some sweeping lan
guage in Holland that could be read to the contrary.15 Next, Golove
accepts the proposition that treaties are "in principle subject to the
separation of powers restrictions which are applicable to ordinary acts
of Congress."16 Again I agree, although Golove does not adequately
distinguish the treaty power's relationship to separation of powers
from its relationship to federalism.17

12. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
13. See, e.g. , Golove, supra note 2, at 1080 ("In Part I, I set out the basic textual and
structural arguments that support the nationalist view."). Occasionally, including in the title
of his article, Golove refers to the "nationalist conception." He appears to treat that phrase
as synonymous with "nationalist view."
14. Id. at 1083.
15. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made
under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the
United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention."); see
also Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1920)
(noting that the Court's "hint that there may be no other test to be applied than whether the
treaty has been duly concluded indicates that the Court might hold that specific constitu
tional limitations in favor of individual liberty and property are not applicable to depriva
tions wrought by treaties"). Some of the concerns regarding this language were resolved in
Reid v. Coven, in which a plurality of the Court stated that, notwithstanding Holland, the
treaty power was limited by the individual rights protections in the Bill of Rights. 354 U.S. 1,
16 (1957).
16. Golove, supra note 2, at 1084.
17. Golove contends that "[n]othing in the constitutional text suggests that treaties are
free of the requirements of the separation of powers," Golove, supra note 2, at 1098 n.53,
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Most surprisingly, given some of the rhetoric in his article, Golove
accepts that "treaties are not immune from federalism limitations. "18
He states, for example, that " [t]reaties have no general license to vio
late the immunities of states any more than they may violate the rights
of individuals. "19 Within such potential federalism limitations, he in
cludes subject matter limitations, the doctrine of state sovereign im
munity, and the Supreme Court's recent anti-commandeering limita
tions. In other words, Golove accepts the possibility that much of the
Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence applies to limit the
treaty power. Apparently, the only aspect of the Supreme Court's fed
eralism jurisprudence that Golove does not believe applies to the
treaty power are the Court's decisions concerning the subject matter
scope of Congress's powers under Article I and the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 At this point, Golove has, perhaps unintentionally, dis
tanced himself from the views of many other commentators concern
ing the implications of Holland.21

but that is also true of the requirements of federalism. The text provides that treaties are the
supreme law of the land and that states may not enter into treaties, but it does not provide
that there are no federalism limits on the scope of the treaty power. Golove further argues
that separation of powers principles are different because they "do not limit the subject mat
ter or content of treaties," but rather "only require that certain subject matters not be regu
lated in certain ways . . . . " Id. at 1097 n.53. To the extent I understand this distinction, it ap
pears to be inaccurate. If separation of powers limitations apply to the treaty power, they
prevent treaties from making certain domestic changes (such as the creation of domestic
criminal law or the appropriation of money) without the involvement of the House of Rep
resentatives. See, e.g., Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980); The Over the
Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925). Analogously, federalism limitations, if they apply to
the treaty power, prevent treaties from making certain domestic changes without the states'
consent.
18. Golove, supra note 2, at 1085.
19. Id. at 1086.
20. Golove argues that these decisions are different from the other federalism decisions
because they concern only lack of power, not "affirmative constitutional immunities of
states." Id. at 1087. Golove makes a similar distinction in an effort to explain the Supreme
Court's use in the nineteenth century of the "equal footing" doctrine to limit the treaty
power. Id. at 1231 n.519. As discussed below, Golove's formalistic distinction, which he
never defends, appears to be at odds with recent Supreme Court decisions. See infra Part III.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 302 cmt. d (stating that, because of
Holland, "the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated
to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements");
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES§ 3.5.l, at 205
(1997) ("The Court (in Holland] . . . rejected the claim that state sovereignty and the Tenth
Amendment limit the scope of the treaty power."); id. § 4.6, at 273 (because of Holland,
"treaties cannot be challenged as violating the Tenth Amendment and infringing state sov
ereignty"); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§ 6.5, at 575 (3d ed. 1999) ("Any Tenth Amendment
limitation on the federal treaty power was flatly rejected in the landmark case of Missouri v.
Holland."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1317, 1343 (1999) ("[U]nless Missouri v. Holland is reconsidered, it appears that there
are no limits on the treaty power grounded in state sovereignty.").
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I certainly welcome Golove's partial repudiation of what I have
called the "nationalist view." Unfortunately, Golove repeatedly de
scribes his article as if it were presenting a full-fledged defense of that
view, which makes his article potentially confusing. For example, he
cites scholars and officials as supporting the "nationalist view" when
they in fact (at most) supported only one component of it (usually the
lack of states' rights limitations).22 Similarly, he asserts that the Su
preme Court has endorsed the nationalist view,23 even though he ac
knowledges elsewhere that the Court has never held that the treaty
power is free from subject matter limitations - and, indeed, that it has
suggested just the opposite.
A good illustration of how Golove's use of the term "nationalist
view" can be confusing is his treatment of the views of the nineteenth
century statesman, John Calhoun. Golove relies heavily on statements
by Calhoun that suggest the absence of reserved power limitations on
the treaty power and argues that these statements show that "Calhoun
seems to have accepted the nationalist view of the treaty power."24
Golove does not mention, however, that Calhoun believed in a strong
subject matter limitation on the treaty power. In Calhoun's view, the
treaty power was to be "strictly limited to questions inter alios; that is,
to questions between us and foreign powers which require negotiation
to adjust them."25 To extend the treaty power beyond such truly inter
national matters, he said, "would be to extend it beyond its allotted
sphere; and, thus, a palpable violation of the constitution."26 By con
trast, as long as the treaty power was limited to its proper subject mat
ter, Calhoun believed, the treaty power would not unduly threaten the
states' reserved powers. Indeed, in his view, the treaty power had
rarely, if ever, been used to regulate in areas reserved to the states.27
In this context, Calhoun's statements about reserved power limitations

22. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1114-15 (Thomas Jefferson); 1140 (James
Madison); 1235 (John Calhoun).
23. See, e.g., id. at 1193-1205, 1243-54.
24. Id. at 1235; see also id. at 1091 (quoting Calhoun).
25. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 203 (Richard K. Cralle ed.,
1851).
26. Id.; see also id. at 253 ("(T]he supremacy of laws and treaties is expressly restricted
to such as are made in pursuance of the constitution, or under the authority of the United
States; which can, in no case, extend beyond the delegated powers.") (emphasis added).
27. See Letter to Henry Wheaton from John Calhoun (June 28, 1844), in XIX THE
PAPERS OF JOHN c. CALHOUN 211 (1990) ("From the beginning and throughout the whole
existence of the Federal Government (the treaty power] has been exercised constantly on
commerce, navigation, and other delegated powers to the almost entire exclusion of the re
served which, from their nature rarely ever come in question between us and other na
tions.").
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are less surprising.28 This example shows why it is inadequate to focus,
as Golove does through his redefinition of "nationalist view," on only
one aspect of the scope of the treaty power.29
Golove's criticisms of my arguments similarly end up getting dis
torted because of his change in the definition of "nationalist view."
For example, he contends that "Professor Bradley claims that
Missouri is without historical foundation."30 The principal support for
this contention is a statement in my article that "the nationalist view of
the treaty power is unsupported by history. "31 I made clear in my arti
cle that, however one reads the holding of Holland, it encompasses
only part of what I was referring to as the nationalist view.32 I did cri
tique Holland, but primarily on nonhistorical grounds.33 More gener
ally, Golove errs in repeatedly referring to my critique of the nation
alist view as the "states' rights" view,34 and in labeling me a "states'
rights advocate."35 My critique was of an unlimited treaty power, not
the lack of states' rights limitations on the treaty power per se.
The problems with Golove's approach go beyond mere termino
logical confusion. Golove's article is itself another example of the very
problem I highlighted in my article: defenders of a broad treaty power
artificially divide the subject matter issue from the states' rights issue
and defend them separately. The principal tensions between the treaty
power and American federalism, however, occur when these two ele
ments of the nationalist view are combined, because it is this combina
tion that would give the treatymakers essentially unlimited power to

28. Moreover, Calhoun actually did believe that there were some (modest) states'
rights-related limitations on the treaty power:
[The treatymakers] can enter into no stipulation calculated to change the character of the
government; or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making power; or
which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of the government, - or the objects for
which it was formed. Among which, it seems to be settled, that it cannot change or alter the
boundary of a State, - or cede any portion of its territory without its consent.
CALHOUN, supra note 25, at 204.
29. There are many similar examples of this problem in Golove's article. For example,
Golove emphasizes statements in the Jay Treaty debates rejecting states' rights limitations,
while neglecting to mention the many statements during the debates suggesting that the
treaty power was limited at least by subject matter. Cf Bradley, supra note 1, at 414-15
(quoting some of these statements); see also Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in
Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. Cr. REV. 77, 112 (explaining that there was a "consensus"
in the Jay Treaty debates that the treaty power was limited by subject matter).
30. Golove, supra note 2, at 1100; see also id. at 1079 (asserting that "the most recent
attacks on Missouri contend that its holding finds no support in history").
31. Bradley, supra note 1, at 450 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 429.
33. Id. at 433-50 (critiquing the textual and structural arguments in Holland) .
34. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1077 n.3, 1279.
35. See, e.g., id. at 1100, 1147 n.216, 1188.
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create preemptive federal law.36 Nowhere in his article does Golove
come to terms with this point. A defense of the "nationalist view," as
reflected in the
be written.
II.

Restatement (Third) and other commentary, has yet to

GOLOVE'S PROPOSED SUBJECT MATIER LIMITATION

As noted above, Golove purports to be accepting a subject matter
limitation on the treaty power. Indeed, he proclaims that, " [w]ere the
President and Senate to make a treaty on a subject inappropriate for
negotiation and agreement, and thus beyond the scope of the treaty
power, the treaty would be invalid under the Tenth Amendment."37
There is, as Golove acknowledges, substantial historical support for a
subject matter limitation. To recite just a few examples, James
Madison emphasized during the Virginia ratifying debates that " [t]he
object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations,
and is external;"38 John Calhoun, as noted above, stated in the mid
nineteenth century that the treaty power was "strictly limited to ques
tions inter alios; that is, to questions between us and foreign powers
which require negotiation to adjust them";39 and Charles Evans
Hughes suggested in 1929 that the treaty power was limited to matters
of "international concern" and thus might not allow for the regulation
of matters "which normally and appropriately were within the local
jurisdictions of the States."40 Thus, given Golove's emphasis on his
tory, his acceptance of a subject matter limitation is not surprising. It
turns out, however, that his proposed subject matter limitation is
premised on a false assumption and, more importantly, lacks any
meaningful content.41
Golove begins by suggesting that the subject matter limitation is a
nonissue. He contends that, contrary to the claim in my original arti
cle, neither scholars nor the Restatement (Third) have denied the exis
tence of subject matter limitations on the treaty power.42 He is mis
taken. As noted above, Professor Damrosch purports to be

36.

Bradley, supra note 1, at 433.

37.

Golove, supra note 2, at 1281; see also id. at 1086 ("A treaty that violates this [sub
ject matter] limitation would be beyond the scope of the treaty power and thus would invade
the sphere 'reserved' to the states by the Tenth Amendment.").
38. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTmITION
1396 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY].
39. CALHOUN, supra

note 25, at 203.

40. Statement of Charles Evans Hughes, 1929 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 194, 194-96.
41. Golove's proposed subject matter limitation is also ahistorical, a point which I return
to in Part IV, infra.
42.

Golove, supra note 2, at 1100 n.61,

1288-90.
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summarizing the state of the law when she states that "the treaty
makers may make supreme law binding on the states as to any sub

ject. "43 Similarly, Professors Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble state in
their popular casebook on international law that the constitutional
term "treaty" "has come to include any international agreement, re
gardless of subject matter."44 And Professor Louis Henkin has argued
that the Constitution's treaty clause "does not imply that an agree
ment may deal only with certain subjects. "45
The position of the Restatement (Third) is only slightly more com
plicated. The first Restatement of Foreign Relations - the Restatement
(Second), published in 1965 - had taken the position that the treaty
power was limited to matters "of international concern" and further
explained that treaties "must relate to the external concerns of the na
tion as distinguished from matters of a purely internal nature. "46 The
Restatement (Third) expressly rejects this position, stating that,
" [s]ubject to constitutional limitations . . . the treaty power may be
used to make international agreements of the United States on any
subject."47 The "constitutional limitations" referred to, it explains
elsewhere, are express constitutional prohibitions, most notably the
individual rights provisions in the Bill of Rights.48 Such provisions may
curtail the scope or application of particular treaties, but they do not
define the proper subject matter of treatymaking. It seems clear,
therefore, that the Restatement (Third) is rejecting a subject matter
limitation on the treaty power. Golove suggests that the following
statement in the Restatement (Third) reflects a subject matter limita
tion: "the United States may make an agreement on any subject sug
gested by its national interests in relations with other nations. "49 While
one could imagine a "national interests" limitation that had content for example, one that disallowed the regulation by treaty of matters of
"local" concern - the Restatement (Third) surely was not suggesting
such a limitation. Rather, when read in context, the Restatement
(Third) was simply once again asserting - in contrast to the Restate
ment (Second) - that treaties could be concluded on "any subject. "50

43. Damrosch, supra note 5, at 530 (emphasis added).
44. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (3d ed.
1999) (emphasis added).
45. Louis Henkin, "International Concern " and the Treaty Power ofthe United States, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 272, 273 (1969) (editorial comment).

46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 117(1)(a) & cmt. b (1965).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5,§ 303 cmt. b (emphasis added).
48. Id.§ 302 cmt. b.
49. Id. § 302 cmt. c.; see also Golove, supra note 2, at 1290 n.728.
50. Moreover, the sentence in the Restatement (Third) immediately preceding the one
Golove quotes invokes international law in a way that directly contradicts Golove's own
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Unfortunately for Golove, the problems with his position only be
gin with the mistaken assumption noted above. Not only have others
rejected a subject matter limitation, but, upon close inspection, it turns
out that Golove's own proposed subject matter limitation lacks any
real content. His position, therefore, actually amounts to a rejection of
a subject matter limitation - the very proposition that he denies any
one supports.
Like the Restatement (Third), Golove rejects a subject matter test
that would require that treaties address "external" or "international"
matters.51 He also rejects limiting the treaty power to the subjects tra
ditionally regulated by treaty when the Constitution was ratified.52 In
stead, Golove suggests the following subject matter test: the United
States can enter into any treaty as long as the treaty is intended to
"advance[] the national interests of the United States in its relations
with other nations."53 Although offered by Golove as a limitation on
the treaty power, it is difficult to see how this test would have any lim
iting force at all. If the President and Senate have decided to enter
into a treaty with another nation, they presumably are of the view that
it "advances the national interests of the United States" in its relations
with that nation. And it seems inconceivable that courts would second
guess this view, which presumably would require an examination of
either the national interests of the United States, the subjective beliefs
of the U.S. treatymakers, or both. Indeed, if anything is clear from the
Supreme Court's foreign affairs and political question jurisprudence, it
is that courts are not to engage in such second-guessing.54 Golove es
sentially concedes this point.55 Thus, in truth, Golove's "limitation"
proposed subject matter test. Whereas Golove's test would look to the purpose of the U.S.
treatymakers, see infra note 53, the Restatement (Third) says: "States may enter into an
agreement on any matter of concern to them, and international law does not look behind
their motives or purposes in doing so." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5,§ 302 cmt. c.
51. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1289-90 (stating that the "international" subject
matter requirement is "unjustifiable" and has been "widely rejected").
52.

See, e.g., id.

at 1291 n.730.

53. Id. at 1090 n.41; see also id. at 1287, 1291 n.730. Golove describes this test as his
"own interpretation" of the subject matter limitation on the treaty power. Id. at 1287; see
also id. at 1090 n.41 ("I interpret this [subject matter] requirement to mean that the Presi
dent and Senate can make any treaty which advances the national interests of the United
States in its relations with other nations.").
54. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (referring to the "traditional
deference to executive judgment '[in] this vast external realm'") (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292
(1981) ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention.").
55. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1095 (acknowledging that "the President and Sen
ate have a virtual carte blanche" in determining "the scope of the national interests . . . to
safeguard and advance through foreign negotiations"); id. at 1262 n.623 (noting the "tradi
tional - and continuing - judicial reluctance to second-guess the motives of the political
branches, particularly in the field of foreign affairs"); id. at 1292 ("For obvious reasons,
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boils down to the proposition that the treaty power encompasses any
treaty that the treatymakers decide to conclude.56
This conclusion is confirmed by Golove's discussion of human
rights treaties. He repeatedly insists that the civil, political, and other
rights of U.S. citizens may be regulated by treaty, notwithstanding his
proposed subject matter limitation.57 He tells us that the treatymakers
could even regulate local criminal punishment - for example, by en
tering into a treaty abolishing the death penalty.58 Such measures do
not exceed the subject matter scope of the treaty power, says Golove,
because the treatymakers have decided that human rights issues are
important to the United States' international relations.59 This claim
may be correct, but it confirms that Golove's approach would allow
the treatymakers the ability to conclude agreements on essentially any
subject they deem appropriate.
Human rights treaties are in fact a likely (and understandable) rea
son for the Restatement ( Third) 's rejection of a subject matter limita
tion. These treaties regulate the relationship between nations and
their own citizens, often on subjects that have historically been consid
ered matters of local concern. Moreover, they are not reciprocal in the
traditional sense, in that the incentives to comply with them are not
substantially dependent on other nations' compliance.60 This latter
point has been emphasized in the decisions of a number of interna
tional institutions. The International Court of Justice has stated that,
with human rights treaties, "one cannot speak of individual advan
tages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect
contractual balance between rights and duties. "61 Similarly, the Hu
man Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has stated that human rights treaties "are not a web of
inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations" and that the "principle of

courts do not feel free to second-guess the political branches on whether a treaty furthers
our foreign policy interests.").
56. Like most commentators, Golove would require that there be an actual agreement
between nations rather than a "mock marriage." See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1090 n.41.
But, as others have noted, that is not a subject matter limitation. See Henkin, supra note 45,
at 274 (stating that the mock treaty limitation "does not suggest any limitations as to the
subject matter of treaties").
57.

See, e.g.,

Golove, supra note 2, at 1090 n.41, 1205 n.420, 1302-03 n.771.

58. Id. at 1078, 1298 n.756. Golove states that such a death penalty treaty "could plausi
bly be attacked as an abuse of the treaty power," but that, because it would "serve a foreign
policy purpose," it would "thus be constitutional." Id. at 1298 n.756.
59.

See, e.g., id.

at 1092 n.45, 1302.

60.

See Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 20 365, 369-71 (1998) (explaining this point).

61. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 19511.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
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inter-State reciprocity has no place" in this context. 62 Regional inter
national institutions have made similar observations. 63
If the U.S. treaty power were limited to "international" or "exter
nal" matters, or to truly reciprocal arrangements, human rights trea
ties might be suspect. Indeed, this is precisely what a committee of the
American Bar Association argued in a widely-discussed 1967 report.64
As a result, Professor Henkin, before becoming Chief Reporter for
the Restatement (Third), famously challenged such subject matter limi
tations, expressing concern that they might be interpreted in a way
that would undermine U.S. ability to enter into human rights treaties. 65
And the Restatement (Third) expressly refers to this issue in explaining
its rejection of a subject matter limitation, noting that " [e]arly argu
ments that the United States may not adhere to international human
rights agreements because they deal with matters of strictly domestic
concern were later abandoned."66 Golove appears to be unaware of
this recent history. 67 In any event, his position, fairly read, is quite

62. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).
63. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has stated that "modern human rights
treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties
of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mu
tual benefit of the contracting States." Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the
American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 2, 'II 29 (1982), reprinted in 22 l.L.M. 37, 47
(1983). And the European Court of Human Rights has described the European Convention
on Human Rights as "[u]nlike international treaties of the classic kind" because "the Con
vention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States."
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 90 (1978).
64. See Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, American Bar
Association, Human-Rights Conventions and Recommendations, 1 INT'L LAW. 600, 600-01
(1967).
65. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 152-56 (1972);
Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1012, 1014-15 (1968); Henkin, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 302 reporters' note 2. Of course, the Re
statement (Third) uses the passive voice here, leaving it unclear exactly who did the aban
doning. But that is another issue. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 432-33. Although Professor
Louis Henkin was the Chief Reporter for the Restatement (Third), my criticisms of it do not,
as Golove puts it, "call[] Professor Henkin's integrity into question." Golove, supra note 2,
at 1290.
67. Despite insisting that human rights are proper subjects for the treaty power, Golove
asserts at times that treaties must involve mutuality and reciprocity. See, e.g., Golove, supra
note 2, at 1089, 1093, 1302. On this basis, Golove criticizes Professor G. Edward White for
his suggestion that the migratory birds problem in Holland might have been addressed with
out resort to a treaty. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Re
gime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 71 & n.246 (1999). According to Golove, White
"seems fundamentally to misunderstand the purpose of treaties," which, says Golove, con
cern "tragedy of the commons" problems that cannot be solved by unilateral acts. Golove,
supra note 2, at 1259 n.624. It is Golove, however, who seems to "fundamentally misunder
stand" the nature of human rights treaties, since those treaties do not, in fact, concern trag
edy of the commons problems. The United States still has strong incentives to protect the
human rights of its citizens even if China, for example, fails to do the same. Golove also errs
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similar to Henkin's and the Restatement ( Third) 's - that is, he rejects
any meaningful subject matter limitation.
Ultimately, Golove ends up retreating to a pure political process
limitation on the treaty power, saying that the "remedy for abuse" of
the treaty power "lies ultimately in the people and not the courts. "68 I
criticized this political process argument at length in my original arti
cle,69 and I do not wish to repeat the criticisms here. Instead, I will
simply make two general observations. First, even with their require
ment of two-thirds senatorial consent, there are some ways in which
treaties may be less amenable to the political process argument than
domestic legislation. In particular, the negotiation and drafting of trea
ties is dominated by the Executive Branch, which is not particularly
representative of state interests; the treaty process tends to be more
opaque, and therefore potentially less open to democratic inputs, than
federal legislation; and treaty commitments - particularly in modern,
multilateral treaties - are often vague and aspirational, such that
their precise consequences, including their consequences for state in
terests, may become evident only after ratification.70 Golove does not
address any of these aspects of treatymaking.
Second, the two-thirds senatorial consent requirement does not
even apply to executive agreements, which constitute the vast majority
of international agreements concluded in recent years by the United
States. Golove's only response to this point is to assert that, unlike
treaties, executive agreements are not immune from federalism limita
tions.71 He provides no explanation for this assertion, and many of the
nationalist commentators he defends have asserted otherwise. In par
ticular, these commentators have claimed that "congressional
executive agreements" (executive agreements approved before or af
ter the fact by Congress) are completely interchangeable with treaties
and thus can be concluded whenever a treaty could be concluded.72

in asserting that "[t)reaties and legislation are of essentially different characters, and to
equate them is to make a category mistake of the first magnitude." Id. at 1093. By virtue of
the Supremacy Clause, self-executing treaties ratified by the United States have the status of
federal legislation. This distinguishes the treaty power from other Article II powers, such as
the power to receive and appoint ambassadors. Moreover, under the well-settled "last-in
time" rule, treaties are accorded essentially the same domestic law status as federal legisla
tion. Bradley, supra note 1, at 457. Golove's categorical distinction also fails to take account
of modem multilateral treaties, many of which resemble and are designed to operate like
domestic legislation. Id. at 396-97. Finally, his distinction is at odds with his own position on
congressional-executive agreements, which allows statutes to take the place of treaties. See
infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
68. Golove, supra note 2, at 1298.
69. Bradley, supra note 1, at 440-45.
70. Id. at 442-43.
71. Golove, supra note 2, at 1307-08.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5 , § 303 cmt. e ("The prevailing view is that the
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in
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Golove himself has asserted the same proposition i n prior writings.73
Indeed, in his article with Professor Ackerman, Golove specifically
claimed (like the Restatement (Third)) that congressional-executive
agreements are now interchangeable even for purposes of federalism
limitations. He explained that, at first, the immunity from federalism
limitations allowed in Holland was thought to apply only to Article II
treaties, rendering congressional-executive agreements "constitution
ally inferior to treaties."74 Through a World War II period constitu
tional transformation, however, Golove argued that congressional
executive agreements became fully interchangeable with Article II
treaties.75 Whatever the justification, the conventional wisdom is that
treaties and congressional-executive agreements are interchangeable,
which makes the political process argument even more problematic.
Ill. SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM DECISIONS
One reason why the scope of the treaty power has become more
important in recent years is that the Supreme Court has revitalized
federalism restraints on the national government's power in the do
mestic arena. This revitalization has taken a variety of forms. Most no
tably, the Court has limited the reach of Congress's powers under both
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment;76 prohibited
Congress from "commandeering" state governments in various ways;77
and bolstered state sovereign immunity in both federal and state

every instance." (emphasis added)); id. § 302 cmt. d ("[T]he Tenth Amendment, reserving to
the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to
make treaties or other agreements." (emphasis added)); HENKIN, supra note 5, at 217 (stating
that the congressional-executive agreement "is a complete alternative to a treaty").

73. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799, 805 & n.12 (1995) (citing the Restatement (Third) for the proposition that "there is no
significant difference between the legal effect of a congressional-executive agreement and
the classical treaty approved by two thirds of the Senate" and stating that the Restatement
(Third) "expresses the widely prevailing view"); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form For
malism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1799 (1998) ("The longstanding majority view, and the set
tled practice, is that treaties and congressional-executive agreements, whether ex ante or ex
post, are wholly interchangeable." (emphasis added)).
74. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 73, at 844.
75. Id. at 857-60. This transformation, according to Ackerman and Golove, involved,
among other things, a recognition by the Supreme Court of broad unenumerated foreign
affairs powers - most notably in Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Id. at 858-59. In his response to my arti
cle, however, Golove states that he does "not accept Justice Sutherland's notion of unenu
merated foreign affairs powers and [is] skeptical about whether the Court today would still
endorse his views." Golove, supra note 2, at 1089 n.36.
76. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
77. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
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courts.78 In my original article, I accepted this emerging federalism ju
risprudence for the sake of argument,79 and I explored the potential
implications of that jurisprudence for the treaty power issue.80 To
avoid confusion, I noted that, like the current Supreme Court, my ref
erences to the Tenth Amendment encompassed "any implied constitu
tional limitation on [the federal government's] authority to regulate
state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in
principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution. "81
It is of course open to scholars to question the Supreme Court's re
cent federalism jurisprudence, and many have done so. But this is not
Golove's approach. Like me, he purports to accept this jurisprudence
for purposes of his analysis.82 It becomes clear from Golove's discus
sion of federalism, however, that he either disagrees with or misunder
stands the Supreme Court's decisions. This is evident in at least four
respects. First, Golove is dismissive of the tension between an unlim
ited treaty power and the limited and enumerated powers structure of
the Constitution, calling it a "retreat to arguments from first princi
ples."83 Second, Golove repeatedly asserts that the Tenth Amendment
is not relevant to determining the scope of the national government's
delegated powers and, on this basis, claims that if the treaty power is a
separate delegated power (as he argues it is), "no question of 're78. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
79. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 394 ("I am not defending here the value of feder
alism, or judicial review of federalism, subjects that have generated enormous literature.").
80. I am not alone in raising that question. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for example,
notes in his recent treatise on constitutional Jaw that "[i]f a particular law violates the Tenth
Amendment . . . by placing an undue burden on state governments, then it is questionable
why the same action would be constitutional if undertaken through a treaty."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 274. Similarly, a recent casebook on constitutional Jaw lists
Missouri v. Holland as a potential candidate for rethinking or overruling in light of the Su
preme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD
CENTURY 850 (2d ed. 1998). For other commentary considering the effect of the Supreme
Court's federalism decisions on the scope of the treaty power, see, for example, Flaherty,
supra note 10; Vazquez, supra note 21; James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda For Foreign
Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obliga
tions on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 997 (1998); Healy, supra note 10; Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The
Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United
States v. Lopez, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1125 (1998); and Omar N. White, Comment, The Endan
gered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause
and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000).
81. Bradley, supra note 1, at 392 n.9 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511
n.5 (1988) (alteration in original)).
82. Golove, supra note 2, at 1083-88, 1279-86.
83. Id. at 1078. Similarly, Golove dismisses the Founders' emphasis on the limited and
enumerated powers principle in a footnote, saying simply that the principle (and other points
emphasized by the Founders) "provide[s] little or no interpretive guidance." Id. at 1149
n.222.
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served' powers under the Tenth Amendment can arise."84 Third,
Golove sharply distinguishes between the various strands of the Su
preme Court's federalism jurisprudence, contending that restrictions
on the national government's ability to "commandeer" states and
override their immunity from suit (which he accepts may apply to the
treaty power) are "an entirely different subject" from limitations on
the scope of the national government's lawmaking powers.85 Finally,
Golove also makes a sharp distinction between the Constitution's
treatment of federalism on the one hand and its treatment of separa
tion of powers and individual rights on the other (and on this basis jus
tifies a differential relationship between them and the treaty power).86
His position on each of these points is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's recent federalism decisions.
A good starting point for considering the Court's recent federalism
jurisprudence is the Court's 1985 decision, Garcia v. San Antonio Met
ropolitan Transit Authority.81 In that decision, a 5-4 majority of the
Court largely abandoned judicial enforcement of federalism limita
tions on the national government's powers. The Court gave very little
weight to the Tenth Amendment, mentioning it only once and ob
serving that states retain sovereignty "only to the extent that the Con
stitution has not divested them of their original powers and trans
ferred those powers to the Federal Government."88 The Court
concluded that " [s]tate sovereign interests . . . are more properly pro
tected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed
eral system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."89
In many ways, Golove's view of federalism is similar to the majority's
view in Garcia. The Court's federalism jurisprudence, however, has
moved a long way since Garcia. 90
Beginning in 1991, with its Gregory v. Ashcroft decision,91 the
Court has steadily given content to federalism-based restrictions on
the national government's powers. In Gregory, the Court began by
emphasizing the "first principles" derided by Golove: that the Consti
tution created a national government of limited and enumerated pow
ers. 92 The Court also expressed concern over alterations of the federal-

84. Id. at 1088.
85. Id. at 1281-82; see also id. at 1086-87.
86. Id. at 1083-84, 1285-86.
87. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
88. Id. at 549.
89. Id. at 552.
90. See generally John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L.
1311 (1997) (describing the Court's steady movement away from Garcia since 1991).

REV.

91. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
92. Id. at 457-58.
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state balance, especially when the alterations concern matters through
which "a State defines itself as a sovereign. "93 The Court addressed
these federalism concerns in Gregory by means of a strong "plain
statement" rule. It explained that, "inasmuch as this Court in Garcia
has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States
against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we
must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise."94
A year later, the Court went further, holding in New York v.
United States that it is unconstitutional for Congress to "commandeer"
state legislatures.95 The Court held that this was true even when Con
gress is acting "well within" the subject matter scope of the Commerce
Clause.96 Again, the Court began with the proposition that the Consti
tution created a national government of limited and enumerated pow
ers.97 The Court also, contrary to Golove's view, rejected any sharp
distinction between federalism and either individual rights or separa
tion of powers, explaining that, as with its division of power between
the federal branches, "the Constitution divides authority between fed
eral and state governments for the protection of individuals. "98
There is, admittedly, some confusing and perhaps inconsistent lan
guage in New York about the nature of the Tenth Amendment. In
places, the Court suggests that the Tenth Amendment (broadly de
fined as noted above) operates as a restraint on national power.99 In
other places, the Court suggests that the Tenth Amendment simply
states a "truism" that all powers not delegated to the national gov
ernment are retained by the states and the people.100 And in still other
places, the Court suggests that the precise nature of the Tenth
Amendment is not important, at least in the case before it.101 Golove

93. Id. at 460.
94. Id. at 464.
95. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
96. Id. at 173.
97. Id. at 155.
98. Id. at 181 (emphasis added). Justice Powell had made this same point in his dissent
in Garcia:
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals,
individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply protected by the political proc
ess. Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment
also is an essential part of the Bill of Rights.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8 (1985) (Powell, J., dis
senting).
99. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188 ("The Constitution . . . 'leaves to
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty' . . . reserved explicitly to the States
by the Tenth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
100. Id. at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
101. See, e.g., id. at 177 ("Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved
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naturally emphasizes the Court's "truism" description.102 But this was
not the Court's only description of the Tenth Amendment in New
York, and New York was not the Court's last decision on the subject.
Moreover, the Court in New York, if nothing else, rejected the sharp
distinction Golove draws between federalism restrictions based on
lack of national power and structural federalism prohibitions on the
exercise of national power, calling them "mirror images" of one an
other.103
The Court subsequently extended the holding of New York to pro
hibit commandeering of state executive officials, in Printz v. United
States.104 The Court concluded that, even though the statute at issue in
that case was within the subj ect matter scope of the Commerce Clause,
the measure in question nevertheless "violates the principle of state
sovereignty."105 Again, the Court emphasized the structural principle
of limited and enumerated powers. It also stressed the relationship be
tween federalism and separation of powers, and the relationship of
both to individual rights. It was obvious by this point that the Court
was treating the Tenth Amendment (broadly defined) as a restraint on
delegated powers. Indeed, two concurring justices, including the
author of the earlier New York decision, stated this expressly.106 If
there were any lingering doubts about this point, it was cleared up re
cently in the Court's unanimous decision in Reno v. Condon.107 There,
the Court stated as follows: "In New York and Printz, we held federal
statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over
the subj ect matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of

federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment."108
The "commandeering" decisions are only one strand of the Su
preme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. The Court also has
imposed limits on the subject matter scope of Congress's delegated
powers - in particular, Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the
Court has emphasized the limited and enumerated powers structure of

by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our
Government established by the Constitution.").
102. Golove, supra note 2, at 1280-81 & n.702.
103. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156.
104. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
105. Id. at 923-24.
106. Id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Brady Act violates the Tenth
Amendment . . . .") ; id. at 936 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Court today properly holds
that the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment . . . . ). The dissent in Printz argued, like
Golove, that the Tenth Amendment "imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated
powers." Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"

107. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
108. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
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the Constitution.109 In light of that structure, the Court reasoned in
United States v. Lopez that there must be limits on the scope of the
Commerce Clause, and the Court rejected interpretations of that
Clause that would allow Congress essentially unlimited power vis-a-vis
the states, especially in areas in which the states historically have been
sovereign. Similarly, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores imposed re
strictions on Congress's remedial powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment, reasoning that " ' [a]s broad as the congressional en
forcement power is, it is not unlimited.' " 11 0
Most recently, in United States v. Morrison, 1 11 the Court held that a
portion of the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional be
cause it exceeded Congress's powers under both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first confirmed
what it had indicated in Lopez
"that even under our modern, ex
pansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress' regulatory
authority is not without effective bounds."112 Otherwise, the Court ex
plained, "Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely
-

obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
" 113 In rejecting the dissents' argument that the political
authority
process provided sufficient protection against abuses of the commerce
power, a majority of the Court once again linked the protection of
federalism to the protection of individual rights. 1 14 The Court further
emphasized the limited and enumerated powers structure of the Con
stitution, and it concluded that "the Constitution reserves the general
police power to the States."115 As for the Fourteenth Amendment ar.

.

.

.

109. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 516 (1997). Golove dramatically invokes Chief Justice Marshall's famous national
power decisions, stating that "few would doubt that Professor Bradley's view is inconsistent
with the great opinions of the Marshall Court in, inter alia, McCulloch and Gibbons."
Golove, supra note 2, at 1282 n.706. As the Court observed in Lopez, however, McCulloch
and Gibbons themselves emphasized the limited and enumerated powers principle. See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This (federal] government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) ("The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated . . . . ").
The same can be said about another famous Marshall decision. See Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.").
110. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128
(1970) (alteration in original)).
111. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
112. Id. at 1748.
113. Id. at 1752.
114. Id. at 1753 n.7 ("As we have repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal sys
tem of government so that the people's rights would be secured by the division of power.").
115. Id. at 1754 n.8.
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gument in support of the Act, the Court stated again that " ' [a]s broad
as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.' "116
A third strand of the Court's recent federalism j urisprudence con
cerns state sovereign immunity. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,117 the
Court held that, even when Congress is acting withiri the subject mat
ter scope of its Article I powers, it does not have the power to override
state sovereign immunity. This is true, the Court held, even when
Congress is exercising powers exclusively granted to it and denied to
the states - such as the regulation of commerce with Indian Tribes.
As the Court stated, " [e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States."118 The Court also made clear that
the Eleventh Amendment, like the Tenth Amendment, reflects
broader principles of state sovereignty than are expressed in the text
of the Amendment.119
The Court extended the Seminole Tribe decision in Alden v. Maine
to hold that states have immunity from federal statutory claims even in
state court.120 The Alden decision was particularly significant in that it
brought together all three strands of the Court's federalism jurispru
dence. All of these strands, the Court explained, concern the protec
tion of a system of "dual sovereignty," pursuant to which states have
the dignity and authority of sovereigns. The Court stated: "Although
the Constitution grants broad powers to Congress, our federalism re
quires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their
status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance
of the Nation. "121 The Court thus denied that its federalism jurispru
dence was sharply divided in the way that Golove suggests.122 In other

116. Id. at 1755 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970) (alteration in
original)). Missouri v. Holland was invoked in Morrison
by the dissent. See id. at 1770
n.18 (Souter, J., dissenting).
-

117. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
118. Id. at 72.
119. Id. at 54.
120. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
121. Id. at 748. Like the dissent in Morrison, the dissent in Alden cited Missouri v.
Holland. Id. at 807 (Souter, J., dissenting). Shortly before this Article went to print, the Su
preme Court decided Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
99-1178, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 640 (Jan. 9, 2001). In that decision, the Court held that the Army
Corps of Engineers had improperly construed a provision in the Clean Water Act as confer
ring federal authority over isolated, intrastate bodies of water that are used as habitats by
migratory birds. Id. at *7. That construction of the Act, the Court reasoned, would "raise
significant constitutional questions." Id. at *25. The Court noted that it was reaching this
conclusion notwithstanding the statement in Missouri v. Holland that the protection of mi
gratory birds is a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude." Id.
122. The Court also applies federalism-protecting clear statement rules in all strands of
its federalism jurisprudence. For recent examples, see Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United
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recent sovereign immunity decisions, the Court has continued to
analogize federalism protections to individual rights protections.123 It
has also indicated, albeit in a brief per curiam decision, that the treaty
power is limited by state sovereign immunity.124
The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence is still evolving,
with many details not yet resolved. Nevertheless, at least one thing is
clear: the Supreme Court's conception of federalism is very different
from Golove's conception. Unlike Golove, the Supreme Court places
great weight on the limited and enumerated powers principle; views
the Tenth Amendment as relevant to the national government's dele
gated powers; treats the various strands of its federalism jurisprudence
as interrelated; and considers federalism limitations to be as important
as, and intertwined with, other constitutional limitations. This is a sig
nificant flaw in Golove's article, not because the Supreme Court's
views are beyond question, but because Golove purports to be ac
cepting them.125
IV. GOLOVE'S USE OF HISTORY
Although my original article had some historical discussion, it was
not primarily focused on history. Nor is a reply article the proper place
for a detailed historical account. As a result, my goal here is simply to
raise some methodological questions about Golove's use of history
and to highlight what I believe to be the tendentious nature of
Golove's historical narrative.
A.

Methodology

Much of Golove's article is focused on history, including but not
limited to Founding history. Golove relies on this history to support
specific constitutional arguments regarding the scope of the treaty
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 99-1178, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 640 (Jan. 9, 2001); Jones v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000); and Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). The treaty power has not been immune from
such clear statement rules, either before or after Holland. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938) ("Even the language of a treaty wherever reasonably possi
ble will be construed so as not to override state laws or to impair rights arising under them.")
(collecting cases).

123. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) ("State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in
criminal cases, is constitutionally protected.").
124. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1998); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 725
(noting that, when it approved the Eleventh Amendment, Congress considered and rejected
an exception for cases arising under treaties).
125. Contrast this with the more defensible approach by Professor Martin Flaherty, who
argues that the same scrutiny that I applied in my original article against the nationalist view
should be applied to question the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. Flaherty, supra
note 10.
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power. Nowhere in his article, however, does Golove identify his con
stitutional methodology. The reader is left to wonder whether Golove
is advocating a strictly originalist approach to the treaty power ques
tion or something else. It is difficult to evaluate Golove's claims and
criticisms, however, without knowing his methodological frame of ref
erence. To take one example, Golove asserts that the proposal I set
forth at the end of my original article (that the treatymakers' power to
make supreme federal law should be limite.d to the scope of Con
gress's powers to make supreme federal law) is "entirely extraconstitu
tional in nature."126 An evaluation of that charge, however, would re
quire some sense of what Golove believes is "constitutional in nature. "
There are suggestions i n Golove's article that h e assumes that I am
an advocate of strict originalism. He declares, as if it were an answer
to my article, that " Missouri is an originalist decision."127 He also ac
cuses me of inconsistency, and even "sleight of hand, " because I pre
sented historical support for a subj ect matter limitation on the treaty
power but then ultimately argued against such a limitation.128 It is not
clear to me why Golove would have assumed I was a strict originalist.
As I explained in my prior article, the principal purpose of my histori
cal discussion was to rebut strong clairp.s made by proponents of the
nationalist view, not to present an originalist argument for a limited
treaty power.129 Indeed, the proposal I set forth at the end of my arti
cle was presented as distinctly nonoriginalist. As I explained, given
changes in the scope of Congress's legislative powers and in the scope
and nature of U.S. treatymaking, "the answer to this question [about
how federalism should be protected in the treaty context] may be dif
ferent today than it would have been in the past."130
If Golove is himself advocating strict originalism, then there is a
substantial contradiction in his analysis. As discussed above, Golove
purports to favor a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. He
rejects, however, an originalist subject matter limitation - one that
would limit the treaty power to "international," "external," or "tradi
tionally negotiated" matters. Instead, he proffers a "national interests"
test, which, as explained above, amounts to essentially no limitation at

126. Golove, supra note 2, at 1310; see also id. at 1279 (describing my proposal as "en
tirely without support in the Constitution").
127. Id. at 1101; see also id. at 1081 ("Contrary to the speculations of even some of
Holmes's most sensitive interpreters, the opinion ultimately rests on standard constitutional
premises (text, structure, precedent, and history) - indeed, originalist premises - not on an
extraordinary theory of inherent foreign affairs powers or even on a view of the Constitution
as an evolving or living text." (emphasis added)). In fact, given that the Court in Holland did
not even refer to the Founding materials, Golove is being quite creative in describing it as an
originalist decision.
128. Id. at 1288, 1290-91.
129. Bradley, supra note 1, at 409-10.
130. Id. at 450.
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all. Yet Golove never explains why it is proper to adopt an originalist
position with respect to states' rights limitations on the treaty power
(assuming he is right about the Founding history) and reject an origi
nalist position with respect to subject matter limitations on the treaty
power. He does suggest that a strict subject matter limitation would
deprive the treatymakers of needed flexibility in this age of globaliza
tion.131 Although that may be a strong functional argument, it is hardly
an originalist one.
There is, of course, more than one type of originalism.132 Some
originalists insist that contemporary constitutional interpretation
should replicate the precise understandings at the time of the Found
ing; this is what I am calling "strict originalism." This version of origi
nalism is probably most famously associated with former Judge
Bork.133 Others argue that those understandings should be "trans
lated" to take account of contemporary conditions. The most famous
proponent of this version of originalism, at least in recent years, is Pro
fessor Lawrence Lessig.134 Still others argue that there have been mul
tiple "Foundings," each of which has changed the meaning of the Con
stitution. The most famous proponent of this version of originalism is
Professor Bruce Ackerman.135 In prior writings, Golove }ias advocated
the last type of originalism, which, to borrow a phrase from
Ackerman, could be called "constitutional moments" originalism.136
Golove does not appear to be relying on constitutional moments
originalism in his response to my article, perhaps because he believes
that some other constitutional theory is sufficient for his purposes. In
terestingly, though, there is a plausible argument that constitutional
moments originalism leads to a conclusion contrary to Golove's posi
tion. As Professor Peter Spiro has argued, there have been a number
of events since World War II that are similar to the events that Golove
has in other writings found sufficient to amend the Constitution.137
Here is a brief summary of these events:

131. Golove, supra note 2, at 1092 n.45.
132. See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1247 (1997) (discussing various types of originalism).
133. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 251-65 (1990).
134. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165 (1993); Lawrence
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).
135. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
136. See, e.g. , Ackerman & Golove, supra note 73; David Golove, From Versailles to San
Francisco: the Revolutionary Transformation of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491
(1999).
137. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1271-74
(1999); Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
567, 576-78 (1997).
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Before World War II, international law regulated primarily inter
actions among nations and did not contain extensive individual rights
protectionsP8 Soon after the War, with the experience of the
Holocaust and other atrocities fresh in mind, the international com
munity began to develop a comprehensive body of international hu
man rights law. The seeds of this law were planted in the 1940s. The
United Nations Charter, which came into force in 1945, contained
general commitments to protect human rights.139 Three years later, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and opened it for national
ratifications. That same year, the General Assembly issued its non
binding but nonetheless influential Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which contains broadly worded civil, political, economic, so
cial, and cultural rights.140 Immediately following the passage of the
Declaration, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights began
drafting a human rights covenant aimed at converting the nonbinding
provisions of the Declaration into binding treaty obligations. This pro
cess eventually led to the promulgation of a number of human rights
treaties, including the wide-ranging International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.141 As many international law scholars have noted,
the emergence of this human rights law regime constituted a truly
revolutionary change in both the nature and scope of international
law.142
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, pt. VII introductory note, at 144; MARK
W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 253-57 (3d ed. 1999). For a discus
sion of the pre-World War II international law protections for human rights, see LOUIS
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLmCS AND VALUES 169-73 (1995).
139. U. N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3 (stating that one of the purposes of the United Na
tions is to "promot[e) and encourag[e) respect for human rights and for fundamental free
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); id. art. 55 (stating that
the United Nations "shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion");
id. art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the (United Nations) Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Ar
ticle 55.").
140. G. A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948).
141. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among other things,
grants a right of self-determination, guarantees equal treatment, protects the "right to life"
as well as "liberty and security of person," prohibits certain criminal punishments (including
certain uses of the death penalty), requires various criminal procedures, limits immigration
related measures, bars "arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . . privacy, family, home or
correspondence," and protects "the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion"
and the "right to freedom of association with others." G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) U.N. GAOR
(1966).
142. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions:
Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1988); Louis Henkin, Human Rights
and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 31, 36 (1995-96); John P. Humphrey,
The Revolution in the Law of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. 205 (1975); Louis B. Sohn, The
New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.
L. REV. 1 (1982).
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United States officials played a prominent role in initiating this in
ternational human rights law regime. Nonetheless, in the 1950s there
were intense debates in the United States over whether and to what
extent the nation should participate in the regime. The principal sub
jects of debate were the domestic implications of ratifying interna
tional human rights treaties, including the implications for American
federalism. As part of these debates, there were numerous proposals
to amend the Constitution in order to limit the treaty power.143 Along
with leaders of the American Bar Association, a key proponent of
such an amendment was Senator John Bricker of Ohio, and the vari
ous proposed amendments are commonly referred to jointly as the
"Bricker Amendment."144 In general, the proposed amendments were
intended to preclude treaties from being self-executing and to make
clear that treaties would not override the reserved powers of the
states.145 Some versions also would have restricted the use of executive
agreements.146 One of the proposed amendments fell only one vote
short of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.147
To help defeat the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower admini
stration made repeated commitments that it would not use the treaty
power in a way that would infringe on state prerogatives. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles reassured the Senate in 1953 that the admini
stration was "committed to the exercise of the treatymaking power
only within traditional limits" and that he did not believe "that treaties
should, or lawfully can, be used as a device to circumvent the constitu
tional procedures established in relation to what are essentially mat
ters of domestic concern. "148 In 1955, Dulles further stated that the
administration recognized that the treaty power could not properly be
used for matters "which do not essentially affect the actions of nations
in relation to international affairs, but are purely internal."149 In addi
tion, the State Department published a Circular stating, in obvious
reference to the Bricker Amendment debates, that " [t]reaties are not

143. See, e.g., Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. (1953).
144. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE (1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
145. For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that "[a] treaty
shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which
would be valid in the absence of treaty." TANANBAUM, supra note 144, at 224.
146. For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that "[e]xecutive
agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties." ld. at 222.
147. See TANANBAUM, supra note 144, at 180.
148. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 825 (1953).
149. Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. , 84th
Cong., 183 (1955).
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to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social
changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures estab
lished in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic con
cern. "150 For decades thereafter, no President attempted even to sub
mit to the Senate major human rights treaties (although they did
continue to seek the Senate's advice and consent for the Genocide
Convention). Finally, a compromise was reached in the 1970s and
1980s whereby the President and Senate would ratify some of the hu
man rights treaties, but only with a package of limiting conditions, in
cluding a federalism clause.151 This clause provides that the treaties
"shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that
it exercises legislative and j udicial j urisdiction over the matters cov
ered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments."152
Combine this history with a post-Cold War isolationist Senate and
the Supreme Court's revival of federalism restraints in the domestic
arena, and you might have the makings of constitutional change, at
least according to constitutional moments originalism. Perhaps this
was what the Clinton Administration had in mind in the recent Breard
v. Greene153 case. There, the International Court of Justice had issued
a provisional order stating that the United States was to "take all
measures at its disposal" to stay the execution of a Paraguayan inmate
on death row in Virginia.154 In opposing efforts by Paraguay and the
inmate to have the Supreme Court enforce this order, the Justice and
State Departments filed a brief with the Court stating that, even if the
United States was bound by treaty to comply with the international
court's order, "our federal system imposes limits on the federal gov
ernment's ability to interfere with the criminal j ustice systems of the
States."155 Strangely, despite his use of the constitutional moments
methodology in the past, Golove does not even consider its potential

150. U.S. State Dep't Circular No. 175, para. 2 (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 784, 785 (1956).
151. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (describing this development).
152. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 102d Cong., 138 CONG. REC. 8071, 'II 11(5) (1992).
153. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
154. Id. at 374.
155. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998) (No. 97-1390). In this respect, the circumstances of the Breard case are similar to
those of an earlier case involving a different international tribunal. In the mid-1980s, two
individuals on death row - one in South Carolina and one in Texas - filed complaints with
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging that their death sentences vio
lated international law. The Commission asked the U.S. State Department to stay the execu
tions while it considered the complaints. The State Department declined to do so, explaining
that, under the U.S. federal system, there was no basis for executive branch intervention in
the implementation of the sentences. See Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States),
Inter.-Am. C.H.R. 147, OENSer.LN/11.71 , doc. 9, rev. 1, '1!'1! 11, 18 (1987).
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application to the present issue. Even more strangely, given his writ
ings, Golove strongly criticizes me for proposing that Holland should
be limited or overruled, observing that if my proposal were accepted
there would be constitutional change "without all the effort" of a for
mal Article V amendment - the very thing advocated by constitu
tional moments originalism.156 Of course, Golove's criticism is off the
mark in any event, since a constitutional amendment is not needed in
order to reassess a Supreme Court decision. But the criticism further
highlights
analysis.

the

methodological

B.

uncertainties

underlying

Golove's

Law Office History?

Whatever his constitutional methodology, it is clear that Golove is
attempting to avoid the "law office history" charge made against many
legal academics who base their arguments on history.157 To his credit,
Golove has read and considered a vast array of primary and secondary
materials, and his article is, as a result, very rich in detail. In addition,
he does an admirable job of situating some of the debates over the
scope of the treaty power within their historical context. Inattention to
detail and context, however, are not the only elements of the law of
fice history charge. A central complaint about the use of history by le
gal academics (and judges) is that it is shaped and twisted in order to
support a particular conclusion. It is in this sense that, notwithstanding
its length, Golove's historical discussion may be considered law office
history.
Although there is much of interest in Golove's historical discus
sion, there is also a noticeable one-sidedness to the discussion. There
are many manifestations of this. Almost invariably, the historical ma
terials that contradict Golove's conclusion are relegated to footnotes,
frequently with a statement that goes something like this: "Unsur
prisingly, Professor Bradley relies on this piece of evidence."158 When
Golove encounters statements by officials that support limits on the
treaty power, he often asserts that these statements must have been

156. Golove, supra note 2, at 1312. I should make clear that I am not myself a proponent
of constitutional moments originalism, in part because the theory appears to me to be too
manipulable, with proponents of this theory finding only the constitutional moments that
they like. For this and other criticisms of the theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW, ch. 7 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional
Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 759 (1992); and Tribe, supra note 10.
157. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193
(1993); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-In-Law, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996).
158. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1149 n.22, 1205 n.421, 1225 n.499, 1234 n.528.
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merely tactical or disingenuous, while accepting statements to the con
trary (sometimes by the same officials) at face value.159 In addition,
Golove frequently attaches his own pejorative labels to anyone who
has argued for limits on the treaty power. For example, he states that
the citizens of South Carolina were not engaging in " [r]ational discus
sion" when they disagreed with the views of one Supreme Court Jus
tice {William Johnson) concerning the scope of the treaty power;160 re
fers to arguments for restrictions on the treaty power as "states' rights
dogmas";161 and says that efforts in the 1950s to limit the treaty power
by constitutional amendment (efforts that received the support of the
American Bar Association and many Senators) were "shameful" and
involved "virtual fanatics."162 Similarly, Golove often attempts a guilt
by-association strategy, suggesting linkages {often no more than tem
poral) between arguments for a limited treaty power and pernicious
practices such as slavery and racial segregation.163
Golove is also opportunistic in his use of sources. The reliability of
sources in his article often seems to depend on whether they support
his views. To take a few examples, he dismisses Madison's construc
tion of the treaty power during the Articles of Confederation period,
saying that it "would have seriously undermined Congress's ability to
conduct foreign policy;"164 relies on what he perceives to be helpful
statements from Madison during the ratification period;165 and dis
avows Madison's view of the treaty power during the Jay Treaty de
bates, suggesting (without much evidence) that Madison was acting as
an unwilling front-man for Jefferson.166 Similarly, Golove relies on
Jefferson's views during the Articles of Confederation period as sup
port for the nationalist view and refers to his "heroic exertions,"167 dis
avows the views of "the irrepressible Jefferson" during the Jay Treaty
debate as reflecting "a legendary hostility to the treaty power,"168 and
relies on Jefferson's views and actions as President.169 And Golove
dismisses John Jay's statements during the Articles of Confederation

159. See, e.g., id. at 1112, 1118-20, 1151 n.225, 1241-42 & n.552, 1272.
160. Id. at 1222.
161. Id. at 1236.
162. Id. at 1274, 1275.
163. See, e.g., id. at 1210-37, 1249-57.
164. Id. at 1111.
165. Id. at 1139-40.
166. Id. at 1182-83. Golove's main evidence for this assertion is that Madison visited
Jefferson's house shortly before writing the statements in question. Id.
167. Id. at 1115, 1130-32.
168. Id. at 1179, 1187.
169. Id. at 1189-93.
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period as strategic and disingenuous,170 while relying on them during
the ratification period.171 There are many similar examples.172
Another problem with Golove's treatment of history is that he of
ten focuses on the treaty power issue in isolation from debates and un
certainties concerning the supremacy of federal law and the scope of
other national powers. For example, Golove presents evidence that
the Continental Congress entered into treaties beyond its legislative
powers, while downplaying the fact that it was unclear during the Ar
ticles of Confederation period whether treaties had the status of su
preme federal law.173 As discussed above, however, it is the creation of
domestic federal law beyond Congress's powers that is the ultimate is
sue in contemporary debates over the scope of the treaty power. In
any event, the scope of the national government's legislative powers
were uncertain during the Articles of Confederation period, such that
it was not always clear whether treaties were in fact exceeding those
powers. Thus, for example, John Jay reasoned in 1786 that the debts
provision in the treaty of peace with Great Britain did not infringe on
the rights of states because the power to confiscate wartime debts
rested exclusively with the national government.174 Golove disagrees
with Jay's reasoning,175 but the key point is not whether Jay was right
or wrong but that there were uncertainties about the scope of state
and national powers, making it unclear whether the treaties were in
fact infringing on states' rights.
Similarly, Golove repeatedly relies on treaties granting property
rights to alien citizens as proof that the treaty power has historically
exceeded Congress's legislative powers, but nowhere in his article
does he conclusively show that, after the Constitution was ratified,
Congress possessed no power to regulate the property rights of alien
citizens. On the contrary, there are repeated hints in Golove's article
that this and related issues of congressional power were uncertain and
contested throughout the nineteenth century.176 Despite these hints,
and despite the generally exhaustive nature of Golove's historical nar170. Id. at 1117, 1120, 1150-51 n.225.
171. See, e.g., id. at 1137 & n.178.
172. For example, Golove dismisses Attorney General William Wirt's states' rights
views as "a too hasty judgment without adequate consideration and research," id. at 1205
n.421, but later relies on other statements by Wirt that seem more helpful to his arguments,
see id. at 1222 n.490; dismisses Edward Livingston at one point, see id. at 1176 n.309, but em
braces him at another, see id. at 1225; and relies on Hamilton Fish when he sounds national
istic, see id. at 1239, but not when he expressly supports states' rights limitations on the
treaty power, see id. at 1242 n.552.
173. Id. at 1102-03.
174. Report from John Jay (Oct. 13, 1796), reprinted in 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION, at 204 (Boston, Thomas B. Wait 1820).
175. Golove, supra note 2, at 1120 n.120.
176. See, e.g. , id. at 1153 n.234, 1216 n.465, 1228 n.510, 1243, 1247.
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rative, Golove does not pursue the issue.177 A similar omission occurs
in connection with Golove's discussion of South Carolina's Negro
Seamen's Act.178 Although Golove describes the legal controversy
over that Act as if it were primarily focused on the scope of the treaty
power, it was in fact primarily focused on the scope of the foreign
commerce power, and the materials Golove relies on often invoke
Congress's commerce power as the primary basis for invalidating the
Act. Justice Johnson did so, for example, in his circuit decision in

Elkison v. Deliesseline,119 yet Golove unhesitatingly describes him as
"invoking the nationalist conception of the treaty power."180 Similarly,
Golove relies on an opinion on this issue by Attorney General William
Wirt as support for the nationalist view,181 even though the opinion re
lies primarily on the commerce power.182 Golove states that it "seems
safe to assume" that Wirt intended his reference to the treaty power to
be separate and independent from the commerce power discussion,183
but this is questionable in light of the fact that (as Golove notes) Wirt
had earlier written an opinion clearly rejecting the nationalist view of
the treaty power.184
Finally, Golove's description of the historical materials is often ex
aggerated. For example, he asserts that "states' rights limitations,
though sometimes invoked, were uniformly defeated under the [Arti
cles of] Confederation."185 In fact, there were serious states' rights ob
jections raised against a number of treaties and treaty provisions dur
ing this period. These objections were raised by prominent officials,
including John Adams, Benj amin Franklin, John Jay, and James
Madison, and they led to the delay or nonratification of some treaties,
the limitation of others, and the nonenforcement by and against the
states of still others.186 Even the important Treaty of Peace with Great

177. Golove does not cite a single Supreme Court decision before Holland clearly
holding, or even clearly suggesting, that a treaty provision was beyond Congress's legislative
powers yet nevertheless valid. Several Supreme Court Justices in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199 (1796), made such a suggestion, but they were discussing Congress's (much nar
rower) powers under the Articles of Confederation rather than under the Constitution.
Golove, supra note 2, at 1151-53.
178. Id. at 1210-37.
179. 8 F. Cas. 493, 494 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
180. Golove, supra note 2, at 1216.
181. Id. at 1222 nn.490-91 and accompanying text.
182. See Validity of the S.C. Police Bill, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 659 (1824).
183. Golove, supra note 2, at 1222 n.490.
184. See Right of Aliens to Hold Property, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 275 (1819). Wirt's succes
sor, Attorney General John Berrien, also rejected the nationalist view. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen.
426 (1831).
185. Id. at 1139.
186. See, e.g., SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
38-43 (1904); 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
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Britain encountered significant states' rights objections. American of
ficials maintained, for example, that the Continental Congress lacked
the power to agree to a proposed article in that treaty addressing the
issue of confiscated British estates.187 As a result, Congress ultimately
agreed in the treaty only to recommend to the states that confiscated
estates be restored.188 It was events such as these that Alexander
Hamilton presumably had in mind when he stated in The Federalist
that the lack of a commerce power under the Articles of Confedera
tion "has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial trea
ties with foreign powers."189
Golove also asserts that, during the Founding period, concerns re
garding the scope of the treaty power produced only suggestions re
lating to the process for making treaties and did not produce any sug
gestions for limiting the substantive scope of the treaty power. "At no
point," says Golove, "did concern over the interests of the states lead

UNITED STATES 280-85 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1860). Contrary to what Golove claims,
these states' rights objections were not based on specific limitations in the Articles of Con
federation. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1108-11. For example, objections were raised against
an alien property provision in a proposed treaty with the Netherlands on the ground that, in
James Madison's words, the provision might "encroach on the rights reserved by the federal
articles to the individual States." James Madison, Report on Treaty with the Netherlands
(July 12, 1782), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 411. Subsequently, John Adams de
cided not to attempt to include the real property component of this provision in the treaty
because, as he explained to the Dutch ministers, "Congress had not authority to do this, it
being a matter of the interior policy of the separate States." Letter from John Adams to
Robert Livingston (Oct. 8, 1782), in 5 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 803, 804 (Francis Wharton ed., Washington,
Government Printing Office 1889). Neither Madison nor Adams made any reference in
these statements to specific limitations in the Articles, and it is hard to see how any of those
limitations (which concerned state imposts and duties) would even be relevant. Golove fur
ther contends that Congress "disagreed with Adams's constitutional claim," Golove, supra
note 2, at 1112-13, but there is nothing in the pages that Golove cites from the Journals of
the Continental Congress showing any such disagreement. See id. at 1113 n.92 (citing 24
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 66 (Jan. 23, 1783)).
187. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay to Richard
Oswald, British Commissioner, Nov. 4, 1782, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS at 219 (Walter
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) ("[A]s this is a
matter evidently appertaining to the internal polity of the separate States, the Congress, by
the nature of our constitution, have no authority to interfere with it."). Golove asserts that
the American officials were disingenuous in making this claim. The only evidence he offers
for this assertion is that the officials ultimately agreed to treaty provisions that appeared to
conflict with their claim. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1 117-20. There is a difference, how
ever, between insincerity and compromise.
188. See Preliminary Articles of Peace, Nov. 30, 1782, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 5, cited in 2
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96, 98
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931) ("It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to
the Legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the Restitution of all Estates, Rights,
and Properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British Subjects . . . . ").
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), at 144 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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to proposals to restrict the scope of the treaty power."190 In fact, this
concern led to a number of proposals for clarifying or limiting the
scope of the treaty power. For example, the New York resolution of
ratification stated that New York was ratifying the Constitution on the
understanding that "no treaty ought to operate so as to alter the con
stitution of any state; nor ought any commercial treaty to operate so as
to abrogate any law of the United States.''191 A different proposal
came from the Virginia and North Carolina conventions. They pro
posed in their resolutions of ratification that the Constitution be
amended to make clear that "no treaty ceding, contracting, restrain
ing, or suspending, the territorial rights or claims of the United States,
or any of them, or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in
the American seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall be made,
but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity."192 And
Pennsylvania proposed that "no treaty . . . shall be deemed or con
strued to alter or affect any law of the United States, or of any par
ticular state, until such treaty shall have been laid before and assented
to by the House of Representatives in Congress," and that treaties
shall not be valid if "contradictory to the Constitution of the United
States, or the constitutions of the individual states."193
Golove's claim that the Anti-Federalist charges regarding the po
tentially unbounded nature of the treaty power were "met with acqui
escence, not denial"194 also overstates (or at least confuses) matters.
Golove makes that claim when discussing the Federal Convention. In
the Virginia Ratifying Convention, however, which had the most ex
tended debates over the scope of the treaty power, the Federalists
strongly disputed the Anti-Federalist charges. George Nicholas ar
gued, for example, that the treatymakers could "make no treaty which
shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsistent with

190. Golove, supra note 2, at 1 135; see also id. at 1141 ("Crucially . . . this concern [over
an unlimited treaty power] did not lead to proposals to limit the scope of the power.").
191. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITlfTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 409 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1866) (amendment proposed July 7,
1788) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
192. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1554 (amendments proposed by the
Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788), and 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 191, at 245
(amendments proposed by the North Carolina Convention, Aug. 1, 1788). The language of
both states' seventh proposed amendments were identical in this regard. North Carolina also
proposed that no treaties contrary to existing federal statutes should be valid unless and until
the statutes were repealed. See id. at 246 (proposed amendment 23). Although Golove refers
to the Virginia resolution, he inaccurately describes it as merely procedural in nature. See
Golove, supra note 2, at 1 141.
193. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITlfTION
598 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
194. Golove, supra note 2, at 1 134.
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the delegated powers."195 Edmund Randolph contended that "neither
the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any State,

can be affected by a treaty."196 And James Madison explained that
" [t]he exercise of the [treaty] power must be consistent with the object
of the delegation" and that " [t]he object of treaties is the regulation of
intercourse with foreign nations, and is extemal."197 The "external"
nature of treaties was crucial, Madison emphasized, because when ad
dressing such matters, the treatymakers "will feel the whole force of
national attachment to their country."198 In light of these statements,
as well as the proposed constitutional amendments and clarifications
described above, it is difficult to understand the basis for Go love's as
sertion that "there is only one statement . . . in the whole debate over
the Constitution - that even arguably supports the states' rights
view."199
Golove also overstates the degree to which Supreme Court prece
dent resolved the treaty power issue prior to Holland. Most of the de
cisions Golove cites as "affirming the nationalist view" simply held
that valid treaties preempt inconsistent state law.200 Others failed to
address the constitutional relationship between treaties and state law

195. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1389 (emphasis added). Golove
contends that Nicholas was just invoking the standard Federalist argument about why there
was no need for a Bill of Rights, Golove, supra note 2, at 1148, but this misses the point. The
standard Federalist argument was that there was no need for a Bill of Rights because the
powers delegated to the national government were sufficiently limited in scope that they
would not give the national government the ability to take actions that would infringe on
individual rights. Bradley, supra note 1 , at 412 & n.124. By applying that argument to the
treaty power, Nicholas was making clear that the Treaty Clause did not give the national
government the ability to create preemptive federal law beyond the scope of its delegated
legislative powers (and thus potentially infringe on individual rights). Nicholas had made a
similar argument earlier in the debate about the Necessary and Proper Clause. 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITIJTION 1135 (John A.
Kaminski & Gaspere J. Saladino eds., 1990).
196. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1385 (emphasis added). In quoting
Randolph's statement in the text of his article, Golove places an ellipsis in place of the refer
ence to the rights of states, and relegates that reference to a footnote. Golove, supra note 2,
at 1147. In the footnote, Golove contends that Randolph was just referring to the issue of
whether a treaty could cede state territory, id. at 1147 n.216, but neither Randolph's state
ment, nor the statement by Patrick Henry to which he was responding, was limited to that
issue. See, e.g., 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1384-85 (statement by Patrick
Henry) ("The Constitutions of these States may be most flagrantly violated without rem
edy.").
197. Id. at 1396.
198. Id. If Golove were correct in suggesting that the Anti-Federalist charges accurately
reflected the scope of the treaty power, it would mean that the treaty power would not be
subject to any constitutional limitations, since that was one of their charges. See Bradley, su
pra note 1, at 413. But Golove rightly rejects such a construction.
199. Golove, supra note 2, at 1147. Golove is referring to the statement by George
Nicholas, quoted above.
200. See, e.g., Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817); Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (Chase, J.).
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altogether.201 Indeed, in many of these cases, the validity of the treaty
was not even argued by the parties. A good illustration of Golove's
overstatement in this regard is his claim that the Court in Hauenstein
v. Lynham202 "affirmed all of the essential grounds for the nationalist
view."203 In fact, the Court in Hauenstein expressly declined to address
the scope of the treaty power, noting that " [t]he only point of conten
tion [in this case] was one of construction," and that " [t]here are
doubtless limitations of this power as there are of all others arising
under such instruments; but this is not the proper occasion to consider
the subject."204 When the Court did refer to the scope of the treaty
power in the nineteenth century, it frequently emphasized limitations
on that power, including federalism limitations.205
It is also inaccurate to suggest, as Golove does, that the only period
of American history in which there has been substantial support for
states' rights limitations on the treaty power was the period shortly be
fore the Civil War, and that this support largely evaporated after the
War.206 In fact, although the weight of academic commentary may
have come to support a treaty power unrestricted by states' rights
prior to Holland,207 there were repeated commitments to the states'
rights view by U.S. officials all the way up to (and even after) the
Holland decision. For example, in a number of instances in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to en-

201. See, e.g., Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); Fairfax Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
202. 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
203. Golove, supra note 2, at 1244.
204. 100 U.S. at 490.
205. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (stating that the treaty power
could not effect "a change in the character of the [federal] government or in that of one of
the States") (emphasis added); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) (stating that
the treaty power does not extend to subjects "inconsistent with the nature of our govern
ment and the relation between the States and the United States") (emphasis added); Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (stating that the exercise of the treaty power must
be "consistent with . . . the distribution of powers between the general and state govern
ments"); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836) (noting that the
federal government is "one of limited powers" and that its authority cannot be "enlarged
under the treaty-making power").
206. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1078 ("The 'states' rights view' predominated, if
ever, only during the antebellum struggle, when the issue became entangled with the slavery
question and the accompanying states' rights dogmas of the day."); id. at 1238 ("[T]he na
tionalist view, in the aftermath of the Civil War, would again gain quick recognition as the
dominant construction of the treaty power.").
207. There were, as I explained in my original article, important academic dissenters
during this period, most notably Henry St. George Tucker and William Mikell. See HENRY
ST. GEORGE TUCKER , LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1915); William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty
Making Power of the President and Senate of the United States (II), 57 U. PA. L. REV. 528
(1909). In addition, many academic commentators who rejected states' rights limitations ap
peared to believe in subject matter limitations. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 421-22.
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ter into negotiations concerning private international law treaties be
cause of a concern .that the treaties would infringe on the reserved
powers of the states.208 Similarly, even as late as a few years before
Holland, U.S. representatives insisted that they could not agree to a
treaty regulating certain labor conditions because those matters were
within the reserved powers of the states.209 These states' rights con
cerns continued to inhibit U.S. participation in private international
law, labor, and other treaty regimes even after Holland.21 0
CONCLUSION
The scope of the treaty power has been debated numerous times
throughout this nation's history. The issue has resurfaced in recent
years for a number of reasons, including the Supreme Court's revitali
zation of federalism restraints in the domestic arena and an expansion
in the scope and range of U.S. treatymaking. As I explained in my
original article, these and other changes have heightened the potential
conflict between the treaty power and American federalism. This con
flict is posed most squarely by what I have called the "nationalist
view" of the treaty power, which would allow the treatymakers the
ability to create supreme federal law without regard to either subject
matter or federalism limitations. The nationalist view can be criticized
on a number of grounds, not the least of which is that it appears to
conflict with the limited and enumerated powers structure of the Con
stitution.
Despite its length and detail, Golove's article is largely unrespon
sive to my critique. The article is off-track right from the beginning,
with its unexplained redefinition of the term "nationalist view. " It then
runs into serious analytical difficulties when it tries to both embrace
and reject a subject matter limitation on the treaty power and tries to
both embrace and reject the Supreme Court's recent federalism j uris-

208. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and In
ternational Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954); see also
HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 187-88 (1931 ).
209. See James T. Shotwell, Historical Significance of the International Labour Confer
ence, in LABOUR AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 41 (E. John Solano ed., 1920); see also
STOKE, supra note 208, at 189.
210. See Pitman B. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 456 (1934). The fact that U.S. treatymakers perceived federalism
limits on their ability to enter into labor treaties after Holland also tends to undermine one
of Golove's most surprising claims: that the Court in Holland was self-consciously inviting
the federal government to use the treaty power to circumvent the Court's earlier decision in
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), in which the Court had held that a child labor
statute unconstitutionally invaded the reserved powers of the states. Golove, supra note 2, at
1080, 1269, 1304. Further undermining Golove's claim is the fact that the Court reaffirmed
Hammer two years after Holland and specifically held that Congress could not use its taxing
power to circumvent the Hammer decision. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor
Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922).
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prudence. Although Golove's historical research is an important con
tribution to the debate, it is plagued by methodological inconsisten
cies, and the tendentious and exaggerated way in which it is presented
undermines its reliability. More fundamentally, Golove's article fails
to appreciate the legitimate reasons why the treaty power question has
been a persistent feature of American political and legal discourse,
and why, in this age of globalization, the question once again merits
our attention.

